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SECURITIES REGULATION
George Lee Flint, Jr.*
ECURITIES regulation deals primarily with the laws preventing
and providing remedies for fraud in the sale of stocks and bonds.
Although this article includes Fifth Circuit cases under federal law,'
the author has attempted to limit the material to that involving state law,
and only briefly touches federal securities law. The author does not in-
tend this article to be an exhaustive survey of securities regulation, but
rather an update regarding developments of interest to the Texas based
securities practitioner.
I. COVERAGE OF THE SECURITY ACTS
The definitions, especially those relating to the issues of what transac-
tions constitute a security and what persons are liable, determine the
scope of the securities acts. With respect to what transactions constitute a
security, the 78th Texas Legislature removed any requirement for a writ-
ten document while the courts determined that an investment in a com-
modity for a commodity exchange constituted an "investment contract,"
included within the definition of "security." With respect to persons lia-
ble, the inability to recover from some judgment-proof fraud perpetrators
led to a profusion of cases dealing with various vicarious liability schemes
under the securities laws. This included aider and abettor liability and
control person liability under the Texas Securities Act, third party aware-
ness liability under the Texas Stock Fraud Act, primary liability of a sec-
* H. Andy Professor of Commercial Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San
Antonio, Texas; B.A., 1966, B.S., 1966, M.A., 1968, University of Texas at Austin; Nuc. E.,
1969, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Ph.D. (Physics), 1973, J.D., 1975, University
of Texas at Austin.
1. In the past, two law reviews included securities law in their surveys of Fifth Circuit
decisions. These law reviews have since discontinued these inclusions. For the last such
inclusions, see Frank E. Massengale & Marie Breaux Stroud, Fifth Circuit Symposium: Fed-
eral Securities Law, 36 Loy. L. REV. 821 (1990) (noting dearth of notable opinions); Dan
R. Waller & Wayne M. Secore, Fifth Circuit Survey: Securities Law, 24 TEXAS TECH. L.
REV. 741 (1993) (finding only one significant opinion).
These surveys ceased because of a belief in the lack of worthwhile opinions. See, e.g.,
Jayne Zanglein & Alison Myhra, Survey Article: Securities Law, 23 TEXAS TECH. L. REV.
377 (1992) (commenting on the lack of significant advances). When reading appellate
opinions one receives a feeling that the appellate judges think that the losing litigant hired
an incompetent lawyer for having raised the issues that the lawyer did or that the litigant's
lawyer raised spurious issues to obtain more in legal fees. A survey such as the current
one, which examines more than just one jurisdiction's appellate opinions, provides a feel-




ondary party under federal law and third party beneficiary liability under
the common law and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
A. THE SECURITY DEFINITION
Based on the recommendation of the State Securities Board and the
Attorney General's Office,2 the Texas Legislature amended the definition
of security to insure that the term "security" applies regardless of
whether evidenced by a written instrument. 3 This change reflects the
long criminal litigation over whether an "evidence of indebtedness," in-
cluded within the definition of "security," requires a written document.
4
The State lost. This amendment will ensure the State does not lose again
for this reason.
For securities lawyers it is axiomatic that the sale of an asset coupled
with an exclusive management contract constitutes a security as an invest-
ment contract. An attorney for a criminal facing eighteen years in prison
and a $10,000 fine, however, felt obligated to challenge this axiom. In
Caldwell v. State,5 a promoter encouraged investors to join an investment
club for a $300 annual fee and contribute money to the club for periods of
up to twenty-eight months. The club would invest a minimum of $25,000
in an international "American rice for African diamonds" exchange, run
through the promoter's off-shore company, that would return 100 to 300
percent. This Ponzi scheme ran over nine years by paying the early inves-
tors with investment monies paid by later investors, while diverting $2.4
million into the promoter's Houston bank accounts. The scheme col-
lapsed when the ability to recruit new investors declined, causing substan-
tial losses to the later investors. The district attorney obtained a criminal
conviction for selling a security, namely an investment contract, in viola-
tion of the Texas Securities Act. Since the Texas Securities Act uses an
almost identical definition of "security" as the federal acts,6 the court ap-
plied the federal Howey7 definition of an investment contract. The appeal
urged that the evidence did not support the Howey requirement that
profits be derived "solely from the efforts of others," since the investors
had certain powers within the team and because the investors' funds pur-
2. See HOUSE COMM. ON PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 1060,
78th Leg., R.S. (2003).
3. See Act of May 20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 108, § 1, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 147, § 1
(amending TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4A (Vernon Supp. 2003)).
4. See Thomas v. State, 65 S.W.3d 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (determining the act
requires a writing), affig 3 S.W.3d 89 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999), remanded from 919 S.W.2d
427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (remanded to consider whether the Texas Securities Act re-
quires a writing), rev'g No. 05-92-01844, 1994 WL 605946 (Tex. App.-Dallas); see also
George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 56 SMU L. REV. 1995, 2000-01 (discussing the
case).
5. Caldwell v. State, 95 S.W.3d 563 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
6. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(A) (Vernon Supp. 2003), with 15
U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1997), and 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)(10) (1997).
7. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). The cause
of action's four elements are (1) an investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3)
with an expectation of profits; and (4) that comes solely from the efforts of others.
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chased commodities. With respect to the first point, the promoter's man-
agement contract only allowed the investors to conduct meetings, elect
leaders, perform tax planning, and pool new monies for investment, while
all contractual power to invest, sell, buy, arrange meetings, set goals, se-
lect advisors, make deposits, disburse funds, and do all things necessary
to manage the affairs of the team laid with the promoter. Testimony of
the investors confirmed that the promoter made all investment decisions,
while the team required investors to do nothing other than invest money,
and many investors did not meet or correspond with other members. The
Texas Supreme Court has determined that such a passive investor role
satisfies the Howey requirement. 8 A court in Texas does not construe
"solely" literally. With respect to the second point, the item purchased or
not purchased by the enterprise is irrelevant. What matters is the pro-
moter's control over the enterprise. The Fifth Circuit has so held for
commodities accounts, 9 and other federal circuits for Ponzi schemes. 10
B. PERSONS LIABLE
The ease of becoming judgment proof in Texas with liberal exemptions
from execution of judgment makes secondary liability very important.
The Texas statutes provide for four such vicarious liability theories: aiding
and abetting, control person liability, third party actual awareness liabil-
ity, and third party beneficiary liability. Federal law adds primary liability
for some secondary parties.
1. Aiding and Abetting
An important method of finding vicarious liability under the securities
laws is through the concept of aiding and abetting. In light of the fact
that the federal securities law does not allow a private investor to recover
against aiders and abetters, 1 aiding and abetting will become a signifi-
cant aspect of state securities law. This Survey period had two aiding and
abetting cases. One of the crucial ideas behind the basic anti-fraud provi-
sion of the Texas Securities Act is to shift the burden of proof for the
scienter element of the common law fraud cause of action, making it eas-
ier for the investor to recover. The investor need not prove scienter, but
the seller has a due diligence defense. 12 The Texas Securities Act, how-
ever, does not make this shift in burden for aiding and abetting liability.
Both courts investigated what scienter is required for aiding and abetting
liability.
8. Caldwell, 95 S.W.3d at 568 (citing Searsy v. Commercial Trading Corp., 560 S.W.2d
637, 641 (Tex. 1977)).
9. Id. (citing Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 138 n.8 (5th Cir. 1989); Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n v. Cont'l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974)).
10. Id. at 565-68.
11. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
12. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33A(2) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
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In Sterling Trust Co. v. Adderly,1 3 an investment advisor and broker
operated an illegal Ponzi scheme by convincing elderly investors to invest
their retirement savings in companies owned by the investment advisor.
To hold the qualified funds required a third-party trustee that specialized
in holding nonstandard and unregulated securities. The third-party trus-
tee approved the investments, despite knowing that the investment advi-
sor was on both sides of the investment, and the investment advisor was
segregating retirement monies (a classic warning of a Ponzi scheme).
Moreover, he failed to follow its own safeguards by taking unauthorized
instructions from the investment advisor, failing to obtain the original se-
curities documents, allowing the investment advisor to hold the original
securities documents, failing to obtain valuations of the securities, and
accepting investments in known defaulted notes. After the Federal Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) shut down the Ponzi scheme,
rendering the investors' investments worthless, the investors sued the
third-party trustee as an aider and abettor. The trial court found for the
investors, awarding them $6 million in actual damages and $250,000 puni-
tive damages for breach of fiduciary duty. On appeal the third-party trus-
tee contented that aiding and abetting should have the same due
diligence defense provided to a primary violator since the Texas Securi-
ties Act makes aiders and abettors liable to the same extent as sellers and
since the aiding and abetting scienter should at least include a general
awareness of the primary violation. The court noted that the elements of
the two causes of action are different. The Texas Securities Act makes
primary violators strictly liable, without any scienter, reliance or causa-
tion elements for the investor to prove, and consequently provides pri-
mary violators with the due diligence defense. 14 In contrast, the Texas
Securities Act does not make aiders strictly liable, and investors must
prove scienter for aider liability.15 The "extent" language of the statute
merely refers to the consequences of their liability. The court also deter-
mined that the language of the Texas Securities Act specifically contains
no requirement that the aider be generally aware of the primary viola-
tion. The court noted that this result conflicts with two other Texas
Courts of Appeal, but those courts based their opinions on federal law
that differs significantly from the Texas Securities Act by not providing
for a private cause of action for aiding and abetting and by providing for
the general awareness language for aider liability pursued by the SEC.16
13. Sterling Trust Co. v. Adderly, 119 S.W.3d 312 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet.
filed).
14. Id. at 313. See infra notes 116-138 and accompanying text for the Texas Securities
Act position on reliance and causation.
15. Id. at 317 (citing TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 comment on § F(2)
(Vernon Supp. 2003); Alan R. Bromberg, Civil Liability Under Texas Securities Act § 33
(1977) and Related Claims, 32 Sw. L.J. 867, 891 (1978)). Compare TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 581-33A(2), B (Vernon Supp. 2003) (primary liability), with TEX. REV. CiV.
STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F(2) (Vernon Supp. 2003) (aider and abettor liability).
16. Sterling Trust Co., 119 S.W.3d at 319. For the two conflicting Texas Courts of Ap-
peal cases see Crescendo Inv., Inc. v. Brice, 61 S.W.3d 465, 472 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1210 [Vol. 57
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Although the trial court correctly found liability, the trial court awarded
punitive damages erroneously. The punitive damages related to a non-
securities cause of action, breach of fiduciary duty. Although the Texas
Securities Act remedies are cumulative of other causes of action, the suc-
cessful plaintiff must rely on a single theory for both actual and punitive
damages. So the court reversed in part, affirmed in part.17
In Goldstein v. Mortenson' 8 the defrauder, through his subsidiary com-
panies, engaged in a Ponzi scheme to trade in the foreign currency mar-
kets. The subsidiary companies pooled client funds while the sole
authority to make investment decisions remained with the defrauder. His
trading resulted in serious losses that the subsidiary companies did not
disclose on their client statements. The defrauder originally made the
trades over the phone, but to prevent losses from rapidly fluctuating mar-
kets, the subsidiary companies contracted with a broker for brokerage
services enabling real time trades. After the Texas State Securities Board
(Board) began investigating to determine whether the subsidiary compa-
nies were selling unregistered securities, and when the difference be-
tween the client statements and the amount held by the broker became
$8.6 million, the subsidiary companies obtained a loan through the broker
without making an application, submitting financial statements, or pro-
viding security. The Board lawsuit against the subsidiary companies
forced them into receivership. The receiver brought an action against the
broker and various middle persons and obtained a judgment against the
loan arranger for aiding and abetting the defrauder, directly committing
fraud, and conspiring to commit fraud with actual damages of $36 million
and a total judgment of $264 million. The loan arranger challenged the
aiding and abetting judgment contending there was insufficient evidence
for an aiding and abetting finding, focusing on the general awareness ele-
ment. The court blindly accepted that general awareness is the standard
for liability, but found ample evidence of it in the record.19 The court
reasoned that the subsidiary companies' officials had told the loan ar-
ranger that the loan amount was to cover the difference between what
the companies had and what they had told the investors they had. By
then arranging the loan, the loan arranger provided substantial assistance,
enabling the subsidiary companies to continue operations and hinder the
Board's investigation. When given information of possible illegal activity
2001, pet. denied); Frank v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 11 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (citing Keith A. Rowley, The Sky is Still Blue in Texas: State
Law Alternatives to Federal Securities Remedies, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 99, 182 (1998) (citing
Abbott v. Equity Group, Inc., 2 F.3d 613, 621 (5th Cir. 1993))). For the federal law, see
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177
(1994); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (1997); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
17. Sterling Trust Co., 119 S.W.3d at 312-25.
18. Goldstein v. Mortenson, 113 S.W.3d 769 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.).
19. Id. at 776 (citing Frank v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 11 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); Keith Rowley, The Sky is Still Blue in Texas: State
Law Alternatives to Federal Securities Remedies, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 99, 182 (1998)). For a
contrary view, see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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and failing to conduct a minimal investigation before, the loan arranger
showed a reckless disregard for the truth. The judgment for direct fraud
failed since the broker's employees, not the loan arranger, made the rep-
resentations relied upon by the receiver. The loan arranger attacked the
conspiracy judgment contending there was insufficient evidence for civil
conspiracy, focusing on the meeting of the mind element.20 The court
found ample evidence of the meeting of the minds between the loan ar-
ranger and the defender. The object of the subsidiary companies was to
keep the losses secret in an attempt to turn things around while avoiding
investor panic. Documentation showed the loan arranger knew the sub-
sidiary companies were not disclosing the losses to the investors, arranged
for a loan in the same amount, was aware of both the Board's investiga-
tion and the defrauder's delay in responding to a subpoena. The court,
however, reformed the judgment since the exemplary damages exceeded
the statutory amount.21
2. Control Person Liability
Another method of obtaining vicarious liability for securities fraud is
the liability of control persons. The Texas Securities Act provides joint
and several liability for control persons, but does not define "control per-
son."'22 The State Bar Comments to that liability section indicate federal
law determines the meaning. 23 The Fifth Circuit determines control per-
son liability under a two-pronged test: (1) exercise of control over opera-
tions of the primary violator in general and (2) the power to control the
specific action on which the primary violation is based.24 During the last
Survey period, the Texarkana Court of Appeals added a third element of
direct participation in the offending act by the control person.25 During
the present Survey period, the Dallas Court of Appeals adopted the Fifth
Circuit's test, without the participation requirement, following the Hous-
ton Fourteenth District Court of Appeals.
In Barnes v. SWS Financial Services, Inc.,26 a registered agent was li-
censed with two broker-dealers. One of the broker-dealers specialized in
20. Id. at 770. "The elements of conspiracy are: (1) two or more persons; (2) an object
to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or
more unlawful, overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result." Massey v. Armco
Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1983).
21. Goldstein, 113 S.W.3d at 769-80, 783 (holding that the ratio of exemplary to actual
damages is not to exceed 2 to 1 of actual damages); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE
§ 41.008(b) (Vernon 2003).
22. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F (Vernon Supp. 2003).
23. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F cmt. (Vernon Supp. 2003); see also 15
U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1997); 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1997).
24. See, e.g., Abbott v. Equity Group, Inc., 2 F.3d 613, 620 (5th Cir. 1993).
25. See Tex. Capital Sec. Mgmt., Inc. v. Sandefer, 80 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana, 2003, pet. struck); see also Flint, supra note 4, at 1998 (discussing the case).
26. Barnes v. SWS Fin. Servs., Inc., 97 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. App.-Dallas, 2003, no
pet.) (following and citing Frank v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 11 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied)). The registered agent also was licensed with an-
other broker-dealer that sold the investment accounts of the plaintiff investors to the de-
fendant broker-dealer. Most of the offending transactions occurred before the sale.
[Vol. 571212
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church-related securities. Since the early 1990s this registered agent had
sold interests in a purported interim church loan fund through the
church-related broker-dealer and continued to do so after becoming a
registered agent of the defendant broker-dealer. There was no interim
church loan fund. The registered agent had deposited the investors' mon-
eys in his checking account and used them for personal expenses, de-
frauding the investors of $1.7 million. The investors, unable to recover
from the defalcating registered agent and the church-related broker-
dealer, sued the defendant broker-dealer company under the Texas Se-
curities Act. The broker-dealer obtained a summary judgment. The in-
vestors challenged the sufficiency of the evidence that the broker-dealer
was not a control person with respect to the defalcating registered agent's
fraudulent sales of the interim church loan fund. Following a Ninth Cir-
cuit example, the court determined that the power to control the specific
action was absent because the registered agent did not use the broker-
dealer's access to the markets, the broker-dealer had no knowledge of the
complained-of transactions, the offending securities were unrelated to
any securities offered by the broker-dealer, and the investors did not rely
on the broker-dealer in deciding to invest.27 This broker-dealer did not
sell church securities, did not receive commissions with respect to the of-
fending transactions, and did not include the offending transactions on its
statements to the investors. The court affirmed the summary judgment in
favor of the broker-dealer. 28
3. Third Party Actual Awareness Liability
The Texas Stock Fraud Act also has a vicarious liability provision for a
person who knows of another's misrepresentations and receives an eco-
nomic benefit by keeping silent.2 9 In Glazener v. Jansing,30 co-owners of
a day-trading company, not licensed as securities dealers, knew of, and
allowed, the company's manager, a licensed securities dealer, to present
himself and conduct business as the sole owner. The manager obtained
loans of $100,000 from the investor under the representation that the
notes providing margin funds to day-traders were low risk, had a guaran-
teed return between nine and eighteen percent, and provided a twenty-
five percent interest in the company. The investor recovered a judgment
against the manager, then learned about the two co-owners and recov-
ered an additional default judgment with punitive damages and attorney's
fees. The co-owners challenged the judgment contending: (1) that mere
awareness was insufficient scienter; (2) there was no allegation of "stock"
as required by the Texas Stock Fraud Act; (3) the pleadings did not sup-
27. Id. at 764-65 (citing Hauser v. Furrell, 14 F.3d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on
other grounds by Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994)).
28. Id. at 761-65.
29. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 27.01(d) (Vernon 2002).
30. Glazener v. Jansing, No. 03-02-00796-CV, 2003 WL 22207226 (Tex. App.-Austin
Sept. 25, 2003, no pet.) (memorandum opinion).
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port a fraud finding; and (4) the Texas Stock Fraud Act does not provide
for actual damages for those vicariously liable. The court disagreed find-
ing that the petition alleged the co-owners not only were aware of the
misrepresentations, but did not correct them, approved them, and made
them their own. The court also found that, since the Texas Stock Fraud
Act does not define "stock", the word "share" in the petition was suffi-
cient. 31 The court also found that, although not all statements made by
the manager were false, the allegation of the ownership misrepresenta-
tion, coupled with reliance and causation allegations, was sufficient to
support the fraud. The court also noted that the liability for actual dam-
ages was for committing the fraud, and that vicarious liability persons
were deemed to have committed the fraud by the Texas Stock Fraud
Act.32
4. Third Party Beneficiary of a Service Contract
The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act provides a remedy for con-
sumers who purchase or lease goods or services resulting in damages
caused by a false, misleading or deceptive act.33 A group of investors, as
third party beneficiaries of a contract with the issuer, attempted to hold a
service provider to the issuer liable under this provision.
In Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.,34 de-
benture holders tried to hold a securities firm liable for failing to conduct
adequate due diligence in preparation of a fairness opinion with respect
to a merger. In the merger, the debenture holders had opted not to take
cash in redemption. So when the acquirer later announced inaccurate
financial statements before the merger, the price of the debentures de-
clined. The securities firm had a letter agreement with the target to pro-
vide the fairness opinion for the corporation, with restrictions not to
disclose the opinion without the consent of the securities firm. The de-
benture holders based their claims on various common law tort theories
as well as the Texas Deceptive Trade Practice Act,35 all grounds some-
times used by security holders against their sellers in addition to the se-
curities acts. These actions failed primarily due to the failure to allege
facts showing that the securities firm undertook the engagement contract
with the issuer with the intent to benefit the debenture holders. 36
31. Id. at *4 (observing the one Texas Miscellaneous Business Corporation Act that
uses the terms interchangeably, citing TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-1.02(A)(3), (6)
(Vernon 2003)).
32. Id. at *1-5.
33. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
34. Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305 (5th
Cir. 2002).
35. Id. at 314 (negligence, gross negligence, professional negligence); id. at 318 (negli-
gent misrepresentation); id. at 320 (breach of fiduciary duty); id. at 321 (fraud); id. at 327
(deceptive trade practice).
36. Id. at 305-14, 316 (for negligence, gross negligence, professional negligence); id. at
319 (negligent misrepresentation); id. at 320 (to establish a fiduciary relationship); id. at
322 (reliance for fraud must be intended, more than foreseeable); id. at 327-28 (third party
beneficiary of the contract).
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5. Primary Liability of a Secondary Party
Although the Supreme Court has determined that a private action
under Rule 10b-5 does not include aiding and abetting liability,3 7 liti-
gators have attempted to depict the act of aiding and abetting as one of
primary liability. One federal district court in Texas faced such a chal-
lenge and decided to follow the SEC's proposed test rather than the cir-
cuits that use the "substantial participation" test or the circuit that follows
the "bright line" test.
In In re Enron Corp., Securities, Derivatives & ERISA Litigation,38 pri-
vate litigants sought recovery for a significant decline in the market value
of their common shares from the commercial and investment banks, an
auditor, and two law firms that had caused the company to present mate-
rially misleading statements in its financial statements. While the court
granted the motion to dismiss of one bank and one law firm, it denied the
motions of the other secondary defendants. The district court noted that
the Supreme Court had specifically left open the possibility that a secon-
dary actor, such as a lawyer, accountant, or bank, might be liable as a
primary violator, provided all the elements of the cause of action were
present, including scienter and reliance.39 The court also noted that the
circuit courts have developed two tests for this liability. The "bright line"
test of the Second Circuit requires not only a misrepresentation or omis-
sion by the secondary actor, but also an attribution to the specific actor at
the time of dissemination and so the secondary party can avoid liability
by insuring no attribution. 40 In contrast, the "substantial participation
test" of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits finds liability in having a significant
role in preparing a false statement actually uttered by another without
the attribution, a test that fails to distinguish the liability from aiding and
abetting.4 1 On the basis of an amicus curiae brief filed by the SEC, the
district court adopted a middle course, the secondary person becomes lia-
ble if the secondary person writes misrepresentations for inclusion in a
document to be given to investors, even if the idea for the misrepresenta-
tion came from another.42
II. ORGANIZATION OF THE REGULATORY BODY
The securities laws generally create a regulatory body to handle the
registrations required by those laws, as well as serve an enforcement
37. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 175-76 (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
38. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivatives & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex.
2002).
39. Id. at 582 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 191).
40. Id. at 583 (citing Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999)). A different district court in the Fifth Circuit has fol-
lowed the "substantial participation" test. See McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 57 F.
Supp. 2d 396, 426 (E.D. Tex. 1999).
41. Id. at 584-85 (citing Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226 (10th
Cir. 1996), and In re Software Toolworks, Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 628-29 (9th Cir. 1994)).
42. Id. at 586-90.
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mechanism. The 78th Texas Legislature made two changes geared to re-
ducing the cost to the State of Texas of operating the Board. In like fash-
ion, the Board amended a rule to increase its revenues.
The Texas Legislature removed the requirement for surety bonds for
state officers and employees. 43 Surety bonds provide some recovery for
thieving state officials. Claimants seldom made claims under the bonds,
so the immediately preceding legislature to save the cost of premiums
removed the requirement unless required by the state constitution, fed-
eral law, regulation, or court order.44 The current legislative change
deletes confusing language in the statutes that formerly required state
agencies to purchase surety bonds. The Texas Securities Act was one of
those statutes.
The Texas Legislature changed the method of funding of the Board so
that it would more closely mirror the funding of similar state agencies. 45
Direct appropriations from the General Revenue Fund funded the Board
in the past.46 Since current appropriations were not sufficient, the legisla-
ture amended the Texas Securities Act to allow the Board to fund itself
through the filing fees it collects for various service areas, capped at
$100.47 The service areas include an application, renewal or amendment
of a securities registration, and an application or renewal of a dealer, in-
vestment advisor, or each of their agents, officers, or investment advisor
representative. Those experienced in Blue Sky registrations know that for
offerings in many states, some states rely on the Texas Board. They re-
fuse to act on the registration in their state until after the offering has
cleared Texas.48 This action by foreign securities regulators shifts the cost
of rejected offerings to Texas. This legislative amendment will reshift the
cost to the companies seeking registration of their securities.
The Board changed its fees for certified copies from $5 to $10 to bring
its fees in line with those of the Secretary of State.49
III. REGISTRATION OF SECURITIES
The basic rule of most securities laws is that securities either need to be
registered with the regulatory agency or fall within an exemption to regis-
43. See Act of May 28, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 285, § 31(48), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws
1247 (repealing TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-21).
44. See Act of May 21, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1017, 2001 Tex. Gen. Law 2226
(amending TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. § 653 (Vernon 1994)); see also HOUSE COMM. ON
STATE AFFAIRS, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 2376, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) (eliminating surety
requirements saves Board $250,000 each biennium).
45. See Texas Senate Report, 78th Leg., H.B. 1840 (2003).
46. Id.
47. See 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 1077 (H.B. 1840) (amending TEX. REV. CiV.
STAT. ANN. arts. 581-35, 581-35-1 & 581-35-2 (Vernon Supp. 2003)).
48. Personal experience of the author.
49. See 28 Tex. Reg. 2830 (2003), adopted 28 Tex. Reg. 5991 (codified at 7 TEX. AD-
MIN. CODE §§ 101.1, 101.5,101.6). The amendment also made grammatical corrections to 7
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 101.1, and changed the original reference to the General Services
Commission to its successor, the Texas Building and Procurement Commission in 7 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 101.5 & 101.6.
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tration. The Board made several cosmetic changes to its securities regis-
tration rules to reflect current developments. Board enforcement actions
against unregistered securities, mostly through emergency cease and de-
sist orders to prevent the rapid spread of offers through the internet, fo-
cused on numerous offers of oil and gas interests as well as con-artist
schemes using a securities setting.
The Board made several non-substantive changes to its registration
rules. One batch of amendments reflect the Board's recent internal reor-
ganization into one Registration Division, rather than two registrations
divisions with one for securities and the other for dealers, and recognize
registration for the investment advisors through a central depository.5 0
The Board also conformed four rules to the recent statutory amendment
removing the requirement to file a resolution with a consent to service of
process.51
The Board had numerous enforcement actions against issuers who did
not register their securities. Most of these offers and sales involved the
internet, and hence prompted emergency cease and desist orders.5 2 A
considerable portion dealt with sale of oil and gas interests,5 3 where some
50. See 28 Tex. Reg. 2831 (2003), adopted 28 Tex. Reg. 5991 (amendments codified at 7
TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 104.1, 104.2, 104.4-104.6). The amendment also el'minated an out-
dated reference from 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 104.1 and updated a statutory reference in 7
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 104.2. For the recent requirement of investment advisor registration,
see Flint, supra note 4, at 2011.
51. See 28 Tex. Reg. 2832 (2003), adopted 28 Tex. Reg. 5991 (2003) (amendment codi-
fied at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 113.4); see also 28 Tex. Reg. 2833 (2003), adopted 28 Tex.
Reg. 5992 (2003) (amendment codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 114.3); see also 28 Tex.
2833 (2003), adopted 28 Tex. Reg. 5992 (2003) (repealing 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 133.8, a
rule concerning power of attorney); see also 28 Tex. Reg. 2848 (2003), adopted 28 Tex. Reg.
5992 (2003) (new rule codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 133.8); see also 28 Tex. Reg. 2834
(2003), adopted 28 Tex. Reg. 5992 (2003) (amendment eliminating uniform corporate reso-
lution form codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 133.33).
52. See infra notes 53-58.
53. See In re Northstar Energy, Inc., No. 03-036, 2003 WL 22122986 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd.
Sept. 2, 2003) (finding oil and gas company $75,000 and ordering it to cease and desist after
its unregistered agents sold unregistered working interests in its drilling programs); In re
Chesnut Petroleum, Inc., No. 03-034, 2003 WL 22036389 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 18, 2003)
(ordering unregistered corporation to cease and desist after it made an offering through
mail for unregistered Louisianan oil and gas projects in units with fractional portions of
working interest and revenues); see also In re Mid-Continent Oil & Gas, Inc., No. 03-008,
2003 WL 14441648 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 7, 2003) (issuing emergency cease and desist to
company that failed to disclose Pennsylvania cease and desist order while it offered,
through the internet, units in oil and gas interest and claimed that the investment was risk-
free as it involved drilling in proven fields, the entire investment was tax deductible and 15
% of the return was tax free; made the offeree represent he was given no representations
about tax matters); see also In re Diamond "S" Oil, LLC, No. 03-007, 2003 WL 576904
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 14, 2003) (ordering emergency cease and desist after non-existent
limited liability company: (1) offered interests in drilling prospects in Mississippi and Texas
over the internet; (2) later told the offeree that the language in the subscription agreement
was just boiler-plate, and the $250,000 net worth accreditation requirement set forth on the
agreement was meaningless as the offer was private and not regulated; and (3) failed to
disclose prior Pennsylvania cease and desist order); see also In re Hobbs Oil Co., No. 02-42,
2002 WL 31869359 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 18, 2002) (ordering emergency cease and desist




operators either are unaware of the securities laws aspects of oil and
gas interests, or felt that the penalty, usually refunding the investment
of the complaining purchaser, was not a sufficient deterrent warranting
registration. Several actions, however, dealt with significant non-
disclosures. Another significant portion of the actions involved con-artist
schemes in the securities setting, with chain letters, ridiculous returns
promised, deposits to sell stock, and non-existent accounts. 54 Others
involved botched attempts at exemptions from registration 55 possible
unawareness of security status, 56 non-disclosures of material informa-
54. See In re Global One Found. (G.O.F.-U.S.A.), Inc., No. 03-22, 2003 WL 21355949
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 12, 2003) (granting an emergency cease and desist order after re-
spondents offered a private placement deal to make European commercial paper transac-
tions and securities available to a Minnesotan and requesting that he provide copies of his
current bank statements and passport-a request that has prompted similar prosecutions
of others by the Board and warnings from the SEC); see also In re David L. Reid, Jr.
(CashExchange), No. 3-020, 2003 WL 21027727 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 1, 2003) (ordering
an emergency cease and desist after individual offered an investment plan through an in-
ternet advertisement which promised that 500% returns were guaranteed for those who
invested at least $10 per week and claimed that scheme was legal since it involved a service
of promotional advertisements resembling chain letters); see also In re Ronald Yeasley
(Blue Sky Inv. Strategies), No. 03-010, 2003 WL 1595249 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. March 18, 2003)
(issuing an emergency cease and desist order to individual who offered a stock trading
program in a newspaper advertisement and guaranteed 100 % tax-free returns, through
unincorporated corporation and non-existent accounts at brokerages): see also In re Inno-
vative Consulting Inc. aka Innovative consulting USA aka Innovative Consulting; Whit-
man & Assocs. and James Bradley, No. 03-013, 2003 WL 1854652 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. March
31, 2003) (London Company from Texas used internet ads to find foreign victims of a
scheme to purchase stocks they hold at multiples of the FMV; (2) told the victims to send
deposits for 25 % of the price; and (3) failed to disclose use of phony phone numbers,
deceptive names of government agencies, and non-incorporation); see also In re Omega
Fin. Group, No. 03-005, 2003 WL 394743 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 12, 2003) (offering, by fax
and through the internet, an investment of $650 that would return $2350 every 30 days for
fax shares prompts court to order an emergency cease and desist).
55. See In re E. Coast Imaging of Fla., Inc., No. 03-017, 2003 WL 1950127 (Tex. St. Sec.
Bd. Apr. 16, 2003) (issuing an emergency cease and desist to a Nevada corporation and
Florida limited liability company that: (1) offered the purchase of shares in a body scan-
ning company through cold calls, the internet, and private placement memorandum; (2)
failed to disclose principal and permanent injunction of SEC; and (3) withheld cease and
desist orders in South Dakota, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Iowa); see also In re
Southwest Earth Res., Inc., No. 02-45, 2002 WL 31926888 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 31, 2002)
(ordering respondents to cease and desist after selling shares in a company to more than 35
investors-more than 15 in one year-in violation of the non-public offering exemption);
see also In re A.B.B. Sanitec W., Inc., No. 02-44, 2002 WL 31906375 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec.
30, 2002) (ordering an emergency cease and desist to respondents who offered by cold calls
a promissory note and warrants for common in a medical waste treatment company and
then claimed that accredited investor requirements and high risk in private placement
memorandum were untrue).
56. The following cases involve investment contracts: In re Thell G. Prueitt DBA Fresh
Start Funding Group, No. 03-041, 2003 WL 22284602 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 22, 2003)
(ordering an emergency cease and desist to respondent who held a seminar to sell ATM
equipment coupled with an ATM equipment lease, with ability to convert to pre-IPO
stock); In re Paymentworks, Inc., No. 03-032, 2003 WL 21953084 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 4,
2003) (issuing emergency cease and desist after companies offered unregistered ATM pro-
gram for equipment with a servicing contract through a magazine and a website without
disclosing the finder fee offer would require dealer registration and that one company was
actually not incorporated desist); In re David Henry Disraeli DBA Disraeli & Assoc., No.
02-38, 2003 WL 1902986 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Apr. 2, 2003) (ordering individual-who used
the newspaper and internet to offer unregistered investment in senior housing communi-
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tion,57 and sales to the public without proper registration. 58
IV. REGISTRATION OF MARKET OPERATORS
One of the underpinnings of the state's regulation of securities is the
requirement to register as a seller of securities before one can sell securi-
ties in the state. Texas now requires the registration of both the dealers
selling and those rendering investment advice.5 9
Registration infractions generally surface when applying or reapplying
for registration. The Board disciplined several selling agents and dealers
for various infractions of the registration rules and Board orders, but a
few infractions involved agents' relationship to investors. One court de-
termined that the Texas Securities Act has extra-territorial application to
prevent fraudulently selling securities from Texas to non-residents. Since
ties managed by another to get like-kind tax treatment, and failed to disclose a tax lien
against himself-to cease and desist); and In re David Henry Disraeli DBA Disraeli &
Assoc., No. 02-38, 2002 WL 31500561 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Nov. 10, 2002) (emergency cease
and desist).
57. See In re NSI Dev. Corp., No. 03-044, 2003 WL 22395432 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Oct. 10,
2003) (running newspaper advertisement and website for purpose of offering sale of notes
returning 25% without disclosing unincorporated status and SEC cease and desist order
prompts court to issue emergency cease and desist order); see also In re Nat'l CD Brokers,
No. 03-043, 2003 WL 22279544 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 23, 2003) (issuing emergency cease
and desist order after respondents: (1) ran newspaper advertisement to sell certificate of
deposits; and (2) failed to disclose bankruptcy filing and Consent Judgment pursuant to
Iowa Consumer Fraud Act); see also In re Softnet Communications Caribbean Ltd., No.
03-035, 2003 WL 22063321 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 26, 2003) (holding that emergency cease
and desist appropriate for company that offered by fax and telephone call, a block of stock
in an Antiguan internet gaming company through puffery and refused to disclose informa-
tion requested); In re European Inv. Trust, No. 03-033, 2003 WL 21953085 (Tex. St. Sec.
Bd. Aug. 8, 2003) (ordering emergency cease and desist to Swiss investment trust that of-
fered safe and locked-in investment return by electronic mail and website, without defining
terms "safe" or "locked-in," while failing to disclose how money would be used); see also
In re U.S. Global Inv., Inc., No. 03-030, 2003 WL 21908941 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July 29, 2003)
(ordering an emergency cease and desist to a purported Nevada corporation that offered,
through newspaper advertisements, investments in certificates of investment even though
it was not really incorporated in Nevada or, authorized in Texas, and failed to disclose its
capitalization structure); see also In re Ameri-Q Energy, Inc., No. 03-025, 2003 WL
21291880 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 28, 2003) (issuing emergency cease and desist to respon-
dents who offered and sent documents to Pennsylvanian and Arizonian without disclosing
cease and desist orders in Pennsylvania, Montana, Iowa, Nevada, and Kansas); see also In
re Strike Challenge, Inc., No. 03-003, 2003 WL 328572 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 3, 2003)
(ordering an emergency cease and desist after company offered, by newspaper advertise-
ment, a promissory note supposedly secured by equipment when it really was not): see also
In re Pension Plans of Am., No. 03-001, 2003 WL 131520 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Jan. 10, 2003)
(ordering an emergency cease and desist to company that: (1) offered, through the in-
ternet, an investment in a limited partnership for growing paulownia trees to harvest six
years later; and (2) claimed the investment was low risk when documents described it as
high risk).
58. See In re Woodlands S.A. Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 03-024, 2003 WL 21250257 (Tex. St.
Sec. Bd. May 20, 2003) (ordering respondent to cease and desist because it offered, by
website and newspaper advertisements, unregistered promissory notes); see also In re ESS
Envt'l, Inc., No. 03-009, 2003 WL 1595243 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 17, 2003) (issuing a cease
and desist order and a $2,500 administrative fine when respondent offered by telephone
and internet shares in a company to resolve problems of hazardous and non-hazardous
waste management without registering the securities or dealers).
59. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-13 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
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the Board's registration of investment advisors is new,60 some investment
advisors' enforcement actions suggest unawareness of the new rules.
A. DEALERS
The Board pursued numerous enforcement actions against selling
agents and dealers. The most common infraction against selling agents
dealt with prior employment efforts to sell securities while unregistered. 61
Other selling agent infractions concerned failure to disclose information
on forms submitted to the Board, 62 violation of client suitability require-
ments,63 and withdrawing client funds without consent, a fraudulent prac-
60. See Flint, supra note 4, at 2011.
61. See In re Application for Agent Registration of Stephen Christopher Plunkett, No.
03-036, 2003 WL 22122957 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 2, 2003) (reprimanding, suspending for
five days, and fining $5000 vice presidents of oil and gas company who sold unregistered
working interests in its drilling programs when unregistered as agents and registered with
another company); see also In re Application for Agent Registration of William Paul Hud-
son, No. 03-036, 2003 WL 22122965 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 2, 2003) (same as No. 03-036);
see also In re Application for Agent Registration of Tony Eugene Morrison, No. 03-036,
2003 WL 22122965 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 2, 2003) (same as No. 03-036); see also In re
Application for Agent Registration of Kenneth Paul Lawrence, No. 03-036, 2003 WL
22122974 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 2, 2003) (same as No. 03-036); see also In re Application
for Agent Registration of Christopher Rene Madrid, No. 03-036, 2003 WL 22122979 (Tex.
St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 2, 2003) (same as No. 03-036); see also In re Application for Agent Regis-
tration of Jerry Glenn Griggs, Jr., No. 03-028, 2003 WL 21468204 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June 17,
2003) (granting application while reprimanding, suspending for 10 days, and fining $1,500
an agent who sought registration with old company and in the interim sold unregistered
working interests in oil and gas projects without registration as dealer); see also In re Ap-
plication for Agent Registration of Todd William Cowle, No. 03-018, 2003 WL 1950128
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Apr. 16, 2003) (granting the individual's application while reprimanding
him, fining him $250, and ordering him to reimburse half of the money and to make ar-
rangements to refund the other half because he previously sold securities without being
registered); see also In re Agent Registration of Alonso Martin Martinez, No. 3-004, 2003
WL 346264 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Jan. 6, 2003) (reprimanding and suspending applicant for 65
days because, in prior employment sold unregistered coin-operated, customer-owned tele-
phone programs while unregistered); see also In re Application for the Agent Registration
of Harrel B. Hansen, No. 02-39, 2002 WL 31526551 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Nov. 7, 2002) (grant-
ing application while reprimanding and fining $5,000 an applicant who: (1) sold securities
as an agent when he was not registered; (2) failed to list problem on Form U-4; (3) under-
took to file amended Form U-4; (4) cooperated with investigation; and (5) for two years,
promptly notified Board of any customer complaints).
62. See In re Agent Registration of Christopher Noel Williams, No. 03-011, 2003 WL
1595253 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. March 19, 2003) (reprimanding agent, suspending him for three
days, and fining him $2,500 because he received complaints against himself, did not dis-
close on his Form U-4, and denied their existence during an inspection).
63. See In re Agent Registration of Robert Michael Graves, Jr., No. 3-016, 2003 WL
1950126 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Apr. 16, 2003) (granting new application and suspending appli-
cant for 150 days because registered agent applied with new company after selling unsuita-




tice. 64  Dealer infractions concerned failure to register, 65  non-
disclosure,66 operating branch offices before Board approval,67 violating
various Board orders,68 and failure to supervise brokers.69
One case raised the issue of extra-territorial application of the registra-
tion requirements of the Texas Securities Act. In Citizens Insurance Co.
of America v. Hakim, 70 an insurance company sold life insurance policies
to non-residents and non-citizens of the United States. The policies al-
lowed policyholders to assign policy dividends to offshore trusts that
would use the funds to purchase common stock of the insurance com-
pany. One policyholder obtained a class certification for an action
against the insurance company for selling securities from Texas without
complying with the registration requirements. On the appeal of the certi-
64. See In re Agent Registration of Douglas Wayne Blackenship, No. 03-002, 2003 WL
193495 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Jan. 16, 2003) (granting registration and ordering a reprimand and
administrative fine of $15,000 because the formerly registered agent withdrew funds from a
client's account without permission during previous employment); see also In re Agent
Registration of Letricia Elayne Preston, No. 02-40, 2002 WL 31627994 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd.
Nov. 18, 2002) (granting registration and reprimanding applicant who, in pending applica-
tion for a prior employer, obtained loan from client in violation of her employer's policies).
65. See In re Strategic Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 03-044, 2003 WL 22279545 (Tex. St. Sec.
Bd. Sept. 23, 2003) (fining respondents $5,000 and ordering them to cease and desist until
an exemption is established or the salesmen are registered because they cold called a Texas
resident for private placement of unit promissory note and warrants without registering to
sell or render investment advice).
66. See In re Dealer Registration of Ameritas Inv. Corp., No. 03-039, 2003 WL
22284604 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 17, 2003) (reprimanding to complete forms and ordering
administrative fine of $25,000 because dealer: (1) failed to disclose through required
amendments to Forms U-4 and U-5 information with respect to the termination and rehire
of an employee for violating dealer's compliance rules for selling viatical settlement con-
tracts and medium term notes; and (2) operated branch office before receiving Board ap-
proval); see also In re Agent Registration of Robert Kurtis Mauss, No. 03-027, 2003 WL
21433089 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June 12, 2003) (revoking agent's registration and ordering him
to cease and desist as an agent).
67. See In re Dealer Registration of Laradorbecker Sec. Corp., No. 03-21, 2003 WL
21133561 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 8, 2003) (reprimanding company and fining it $5,000 for
selling securities through an unregistered agent at an unapproved branch office).
68. See In re Dealer Registration of Premier Group, Inc., No. 03-023, 2003 WL
21250256 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 19, 2003) (reprimanding company and suspending it for
three days, as well as fining it $5,000 after it used unregistered agents for a telephone script
for oil and gas investments while it was under a Consent Order not use unregistered agents
when engaging in unregistered securities activity); see also In re Dealer Registration of
Lone Star Sec., Inc., No. 03-012, 2003 WL 1787580 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. March 24, 2003)
(ordering a reprimand and administrative fine of $10,000 for a company that, in prior in-
spection entered into an Undertaking not to engage in public solicitation of the sale of
securities and to provide copies of the Undertaking to agents, did not maintain records as
required by the Undertaking, prompting California to issue cease and desist order).
69. See In re Dealer Registration of James Wheeler & Co. Inv., Inc., No. 03-015, 2003
WL 19358338 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Apr. 14, 2003) (ordering reprimand, 365 day suspension,
and an Undertaking to cooperate with Board investigations of employees because broker-
age: (1) failed to report it moved its branch office of Form BD; (2) failed to verify invest-
ment advisor status for individuals on Form U-4, which also violates NASD rule 3010; (3)
failed to record fifteen individuals' investments that totaled $400,000 which violates NASD
rule 3040; and (4) failed to get these customers' information, which violates NASD rule
2310).




fication, the insurance company urged that the choice of law rules would
differ for each member of the class, destroying the commonality of issues.
The court noted that Texas choice of law analysis follows a statutory di-
rective, if present, rather than looking at the number of factors that might
differ among class members. The Texas Securities Act contains such a
directive, prohibiting unregistered sellers from selling from Texas, even to
non-resident purchasers. 71 The court similarly rejected other Texas Se-
curities Act objections to the certification. 72
B. INVESTMENT ADVISORS
The Board had several enforcement actions against investment advi-
sors. These actions involved non-disclosure on forms submitted to the
Board;73 possible unawareness of investment advisor status;74 and render-
ing service before registration, 75 while registration was pending,76 or after
registration terminated. 77
71. Id. at 723-24 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-12, 33A(1) (Vernon Supp.
2003), with support from rules, see 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.7 (2003), and the old Regu-
lation B cases, Enntex Oil & Gas Co. v. State, 560 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Rio Grande Oil Co. v. State, 539 S.W.2d 917, 921-22
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
72. See id. at 716-21 (holding the defined class did not require a finding that the poli-
cies were securities, or were in fact sold from Texas, so the court did not impermissibly
reach the merits); see also id. at 722-26 (noting that the granting of attorney's fees based on
conduct of each party to the underlying transaction does not destroy commonality of is-
sues, since the transaction is not the registration, and does not involve unique misrepresen-
tations, reliances, or policyholders' knowledge).
73. See In re Inv. Advisor Representative and Agent Registration of Russell Kent
Childs, No. 03-031, 2003 WL 21953082 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 1, 2003) (reprimanding advi-
sor and fining him $5,000 because (1) the advisor recommended that client sell municipal
bonds and certificates of deposits for variable annuities; (2) clients later complained of
damages of $58,000; (3) the advisor settled and later made additional payments to client;
and (4) advisor failed to disclose on Form U-4); see also In re Inv. Advisor Representative
and Agent Registration of Russell Kent Childs, 2003 WL 21953083 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July
20, 2003) (the Undertaking); In re Application for Inv. Advisor Representative of Alan
Ken Flake, No. 03-029, 2003 WL 21666147 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July 9, 2003) (granting invest-
ment advisor representative's application, while reprimanding him, suspending him for 15
days, and fining him $3,000 because he, while seeking representation with another com-
pany, failed to disclose own bankruptcy on Form U-4); see also Application for Inv. Advi-
sor Representative of Alan Ken Flake, 2003 WL 21666148 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July 9, 2003)
(revoking registration with other company).
74. See In re Kenneth R. Golightly, No. 03-014, 2003 WL 1905634 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd.
April 10, 2003) (ordering individual to cease and desist and to take an undertaking to repay
some money to investors after he convinced two investors to invest with him, deposited
their money in his Charles Schwab account, and traded through the internet).
75. See In re Application for Inv. Advisor Registration of Kleinheinz Capital Partners,
Inc. and the Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of John Burke Keinheinz, No. 02-43,
2002 WL 31869363 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002) (granting application while reprimand-
ing and ordering administrative fine of $60,000 because it, while filing for investment advi-
sor, rendered such service when not registered).
76. See In re Application for Inv. Advisor Registration of Murphy Fin. Advisors, Inc.,
No. 03-26, 2003 WL 21433090 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June 5, 2003) (granting application and
reprimanding for rendering service while application was pending).
77. See In re Applications for Inv. Adviser Registration of Willingham Asset Mgmt.,
Inc., No. 03-006, 2003 WL 576910 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 14, 2003) (granting application
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V. REGISTRATION OF PUBLIC COMPANIES
The federal approach to the secondary market requires disclosure con-
cerning companies whose securities are publicly traded. The strength of
the American capital markets depend on investor confidence in those re-
ports. Congress determined that recent allegations of misdeeds by corpo-
rate executives, independent auditors, and underwriters have undermined
that confidence. So Congress recently passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act7 8
to correct the perceived deficiencies in that reporting system and to im-
pose certain obligations on public companies, their officers and agents to
restore investor confidence. In accordance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
the SEC has completed most of the required rule-making mandated by
the act.
A. REPORTING
The SEC's new reporting rules focus on reconciling management's ac-
counting with the accounting expected by investors, professional stan-
dards imposed on officers enforced through reporting, and more rapid
disclosures commensurate with the information age's capabilities.
To prevent misleading investors through unusual accounting, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the SEC to issue rules requiring that, for
pro-forma financial information disclosed or released by a public com-
pany, the company reconcile it with the financial condition and results of
operations under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 79
Under this authority, the SEC adopted a new Regulation G that applies
whenever a company publicly discloses or releases material information
that includes a non-GAAP financial measure. Regulation G requires that
disclosures or releases of non-GAAP financial measures include a com-
parison of the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure and a
reconciliation of the disclosed non-GAAP financial measure to the com-
parable GAAP financial measure. 80
To end one perceived egregious accounting practice, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act directed the SEC to devise rules for fully disclosing off-balance
sheet transactions that may have a current or future material effect on the
financial condition of the issuer.81 The SEC rules require this disclosure
in a separately captioned subsection of "Management's Discussion and
Analysis" with a tabular overview of certain known contractual obliga-
tions. The definition of "off-balance sheet arrangements," is aimed at the
methods typically used by issuers to structure transactions that incur risks
while reprimanding and imposing $5,000 fine for rendering investment service after regis-
tration was terminated for non-renewal).
78. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Publ. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
79. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Publ. L. No. 107-204, § 401(b), 116 Stat. 745, 786
(2002).
80. In re Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Fin. Matters, SEC Rel. 33-8176, 2003 WL
161117 (Jan. 22, 2003) (adding Regulation G, 17 C.F.R. § 244.100-102) (2003).
81. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 401(a), 116 Stat. 745, 785 (2002) (15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78m(i) & (j) (Supp. 2003)).
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of loss that are not fully apparent to investors. Therefore, it includes con-
tractual arrangements such as certain guarantee contracts, retained and
contingent interests in assets transferred to an unconsolidated entity, de-
rivative instruments that are classified as equity, or material variable in-
terest in unconsolidated entities that conduct certain activities. The rules
require disclosure of the off-balance sheet arrangements': (1) business
purpose; (2) impact on liquidity, capital resources, credit risk support or
other benefits; (3) financial impact; and (4) known events, demands, com-
mitments, trends or uncertainties that impact the issuer's ability to benefit
from the off-balance sheet arrangement. 82
The professional standards enforced through reporting deal with of-
ficer ethics, financial experts on audit committees, certifications, and in-
ternal controls. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates that public companies
must annually disclose whether the company has adopted a code of ethics
for its principle officers and make it available to the public or explain why
it has not. 83 The SEC has amended its disclosure rules and forms to re-
quire: public disclosure of the code of ethics on the internet or as an
exhibit to the annual report; and disclosure of amendments to the code of
ethics and waivers granted to officers within five business days on Form 8-
K or the internet.84
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides that public companies disclose annu-
ally whether the company has at least one "financial expert" on its audit
committee or explain why it does not.8 5 The SEC has amended its disclo-
sure rules and forms to specify the attributes of the audit committee's
financial expert and the manner of acquiring those attributes with a safe
harbor provision protecting the financial expert from "expert" status for
other aspects of the federal security laws. The amended rules also pro-
vide that the designation of financial expert does not impose any addi-
tional liability to that imposed without the designation, and that the other
directors are not relieved of any of their usual liability by virtue of the
designation. 86
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act directs the SEC to adopt rules requiring each
annual report to contain a statement that it is management's responsibil-
ity to establish an adequate internal control structure, and an assessment
82. In re Disclosure of Mgmt's Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet Ar-
rangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, SEC Rel. 33-8182, 2003 WL 175446
(Jan. 28, 2003) (amending Regulation SB, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2003), Regulation S-K, 17
C.F.R. § 229 (2003), and the Forms, 17 C.F.R. § 249 (2003)).
83. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7264 (Supp. 2003).
84. In re Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, SEC Rel. 33-8177, 2003 WL 164269 (Jan. 23, 2003) (amending Regulation SB, 17
C.F.R. § 229, Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229, and the Forms, 17 C.F.R. § 249), corrected
by In re Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SEC Rel. 33-8177A, 2003 WL 1561444 (Mar. 26, 2003).
85. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7265 (Supp. 2003).
86. In re Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, SEC Rel. 33-8177, 2003 WL 164269 (amending Regulation SB, 17 C.F.R. § 229, Reg-
ulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229, and the Forms, 17 C.F.R. § 249), corrected by In re Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, SEC Rel. 33-8177A, 2003 WL 1561444 (Mar. 26, 2003).
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of the effectiveness of the controls for financial reporting.8 7 The rule pro-
vides that management must disclose any material weaknesses and can
not conclude the controls are effective if there is one or more material
weakness. The rule requires that the framework used by management to
evaluate the control system is based on a recognized control framework
established by a body using due process procedures, in particular, public
comment. The rule also requires companies to perform quarterly evalua-
tions of changes that have or are likely to materially affect the company's
controls over financial reporting.88
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the officers to certify certain aspects
of the financial statements and to certify compliance with the Exchange
Act.89 Last year the SEC adopted rules with respect to the certifica-
tions. 90 This year the SEC amended these rules to provide that the certi-
fications appear as exhibits to the respective reports.91
To lessen the impact of insider trading before disclosure is made to the
public, the rules provide for a more rapid disclosure. The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act requires public companies to disclose material changes in financial
condition or operations to the public on a rapid and current basis. 92 The
SEC requires this disclosure on Form 8-K, unless made orally, telephoni-
cally, by webcast, or by broadcast within forty-eight hours of a related
filing on Form 8-K, the presentation is accessible by the public, and the
information is also posted on the company's Website. 93
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires electronic filing of beneficial owner-
ship reports of directors, officers, and principal security holders. 94 The
SEC rule requires these insiders to file them with the SEC on the ED-
GAR system and then post them by the end of the business day after
filing on the company's website or on a third-party service.95
B. LIMITATIONS ON DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
Another perceived evil involved Enron Corporation's management dis-
posing of their declining shares when employees with shares in employee
87. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262 (Supp. 2003).
88. In re Mgmt's Report on Internal Control Over Fin. Reporting and Certification of
Disclosure in Exch. Act Periodic Reports, SEC Rel. 33-8238, 2003 WL 21294970 (June 5,
2003) (amending various rules and forms).
89. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241 & 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. 2003).
90. Certification of Disclosure in Cos.' Quarterly and Annual Reports, SEC Rel. 33-
8124, 2003 WL 31720215 (Sept. 9, 2002) (adopting among others Rules 13a-14, 13a-15, 15d-
14, and 15d-15, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-14, 240.13a-15, 240.15d-14, and 15d-15 (2003)).
91. Certification of Disclosure, SEC Rel. 33-8212, 2003 WL 1447826 (Mar. 21, 2003)
(proposed amendment to Rules 13a-14 & 15d-14), adopted by SEC Rel. 33-8238 (June 5,
2003).
92. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(l) (Supp. 2003).
93. In re Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Matters, SEC Rel. 33-8176, 2003
WL 161117 (Jan. 22, 2003) (amending Form 8-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2003)).
94. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 403, 116 Stat. 745, 788 (2002)
(amending 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p (West 2003)).
95. In re Mandated Electronic Filing and Website Posting for Forms 3, 4, and 5, SEC
Rel. 33-8230, 2003 WL 21025853, at *4 (May 7, 2003) (amending various rules and forms).
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benefit plans could not. Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits this practice. 96 The
SEC has devised a new Regulation Blackout Trading Restriction
(BTR).97 Regulation BTR adopts concepts from the rules under Section
16 of the Exchange Act, using the same definition for "director" and "of-
ficer" for "executive officer." The regulation also extends to indirect ac-
quisitions and dispositions through family members, partnerships,
corporations, and trusts. The regulation sets forth damages in a private
action as the difference between the amount paid or received for the eq-
uity security on the date of the transaction during the blackout period
and the amount that would have been paid or received if the transaction
had taken place outside of the blackout period. The regulation also pro-
vides for the contents and timing of the notice to directors, executive of-
ficers, and to the SEC.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the SEC to establish rules prohibiting
directors and officers of public companies from fraudulently influencing,
coercing, manipulating, or misleading any auditor performing the com-
pany's audit.98 The standard specified in the SEC's rule finds improper
influence when the director or officer knew or should have known that
the action, if successful, could result in rendering the company's financial
statements materially misleading. The rule provides examples of conduct
that improperly influence an auditor, such as offering or paying financial
incentives, providing the auditor with inaccurate legal analysis, threaten-
ing to cancel existing non-audit or audit engagements if the auditor ob-
jects to the company's accounting, seeking to remove an audit partner
that objects to the company's accounting, blackmailing, and making phys-
ical threats. 99
C. REGULATIONS OF LAWYERS AND ACCOUNTANTS
To avoid auditor conflicts of interest, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits
public accounting firms from providing a public company non-audit ser-
vices at the same time they are providing the company with audit ser-
vices. 10 0 The SEC has adopted rules defining the prohibited services,
requiring audit partners to rotate after a number of years, destroying au-
ditor independence for those issuers with an officer that was a former
employee of the auditor within the last year or the auditor based compen-
sation of procuring engagements with that issuer for non-audit services,
requiring the auditor to report certain critical accounting policies to the
audit committee, requiring the audit committee to approve all audit and
96. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 306, 116 Stat. 745, 779 (2002);
15 U.S.C.A. § 7244(a) (West 2003).
97. In re Insider Trades During Pension Fund Blackout Periods, SEC Rel. 34-47225,
2003 WL 152486, at *1 (Jan. 22, 2003) (adding Regulation BTR, 17 C.F.R. § 245.100-104).
98. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 303, 116 Stat. 745, 778 (2002);
15 U.S.C.A. § 7242 (West 2003).
99. In re Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, SEC Rel. 34-47890, 2003 WL
21148349, at *5-6 (May 20, 2003) (amending 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (2003)).
100. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 116 Stat. 745, 771 (2002);
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West 2003).
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non-audit services provided by the auditor, and requiring disclosure to
investors of information about audit and non-audit services and fees.10
To prevent destruction of evidence of auditor wrong-doing, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires auditor retention of audit records for five
years.102 The SEC has adopted a rule requiring accounting firms to retain
records relevant to the audits and reviews of public companies, including
work papers, memoranda, correspondence, communications, and records
created, sent, or received in connection with the audit or review. Moreo-
ver, those records must contain conclusions, opinions, analyses, or finan-
cial data related to the audit or review for seven years after conclusion of
the audit or review.103
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the SEC to adopt rules requiring
minimum standards of professional conduct for securities lawyers repre-
senting issuers.10 4 The SEC has adopted "report up-the-ladder" rules ba-
sically as proposed,10 5 leaving the controversial issue of "noisy
withdrawal" rules open. The final "report-up-the-ladder" rules, however,
make it clear that the SEC intends an objective, rather than subjective,
standard involving credible evidence triggering the obligation. Namely, it
would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent and com-
petent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material
violation has occurred, is ongoing or is about to occur. 106
VI. SECURITIES FRAUD
One of the major reasons legislatures passed securities acts was to facil-
itate actions by investors to recover their money through a simplified
fraud action that did away with the most difficult elements to prove in a
common law fraud action, namely scienter, reliance, and privity.
A. NEW LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES
The Texas Legislature made three changes with respect to remedies for
fraud, all pursuant to the recommendation of the State Securities Board
and the Attorney General's Office. First, the Securities Commissioner
may provide assistance to an authorized, requesting securities regulator
in a foreign jurisdiction investigating securities violations. 10 7 In determin-
101. In re Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Indepen-
dence, SEC Rel. 33-8183, 2003 WL 183801 (Jan. 28, 2003) (amending various rules).
102. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 802, 116 Stat. 745, 800 (2002);
18 U.S.C.A. § 1520 (West 2003).
103. In re Retention of Records Relevant to Audits and Reviews, SEC Rel. 33-8180,
2003 WL 164273 (Jan. 24, 2003) (adding Rule 2-06 of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-
06).
104. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (2002);
15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West 2003).
105. For the proposal, see Flint, supra note 4, at 2015.
106. In re Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, SEC
Rel. 33-8185, 2003 WL 193527, at *2 (Jan. 29, 2003) (adding 17 C.F.R. § 205.1-7).
107. See Act of Sept. 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 108 § 2, 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 147,
148 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (amending TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581, § 28).
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ing whether to provide such assistance, the Commissioner may consider
reciprocal agreements of assistance, whether such assistance would
prejudice the public policy of the State of Texas, whether the conduct
under investigation would have violated Texas securities laws if commit-
ted in Texas, and the availability of resources.10 8
Reflective of the effort to suppress multi-state fraud, the State Securi-
ties Board participated in several multi-state prosecutions with the SEC
against conflicts of interests in full-service brokerage houses. 10 9 In order
to attract underwriting clients, these firms encouraged their securities
analysts through compensation schemes based on underwriting revenues
to provide coverage and buy recommendations for both their underwrit-
ing clients and potential underwriting clients. 110 Besides the hefty fines,
the various states required the brokerage houses to agree to separate
their analyst and underwriting functions and to provide notice of this po-
tential conflict of interest.1 I'
The second legislative change makes it a crime to render services as an
108. See Act of Sept. 1, 2003, 78th Leg. R.S., ch. 108, § 2, 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 147
(Vernon Supp. 2004); Comm. on Gov't Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 1060, 78th Leg., R.S.
(2003) (emphasizing reciprocal assistance).
109. See In re Dealer Registration of Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., No. 03-045, 2003 WL
22395433, at *13 (Tex. State Sec. Bd. Oct. 13, 2003) (awarding $1,606,557 administrative
fine to Texas in a multi-state fine of $25,000,000); In re Dealer Registration of U.S.
Bancorp Piper Jaffray Inc., No. 03-042, 2003 WL 22279543, at *12 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept.
23, 2003) (awarding $803,329 administrative fine to Texas of multi-state fine of
$12,500,000); In re Dealer Registration of Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, No. 03-040, 2003
WL 22284605, at *19 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 18, 2003) (awarding $4,819,970 administrative
fine to Texas of multi-state fine of $200,000,000); In re Dealer Registrations of UBS
Warburg L.L.C., No. 03-038, 2003 WL 22284603, at * 14 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 17, 2003
(Sept. 17, 2003) (awarding $1,6006,657 administrative fine to Texas of multi-state fine of
$80,000,000); In re Dealer Registration of Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 03-037, 2003 WL
22122996, at *19 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 5, 2003) (awarding $1,606,657 administrative fine
to Texas of multi-state fine of $110,000,000); see also In re Dealer Registration of J.P. Mor-
gan Securities Inc. No. 03-019, 2003 WL 21024847, at *12 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Apr. 24, 2003)
(reprimanding and fining $1,606,657); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
No. 02-41, 2002 WL 31685726, at *6 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Nov. 26, 2002) (using New York
investigation to obtain a fine of $3,473,787).
The New York Attorney General's investigation into Merrill Lynch prompted these
cases. See In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). These
cases spawned a provision in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 502,
116 Stat. 745, 791 (2002), now § 15D of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. A. § 78o-6 (West
Supp. 2003), directing the SEC to promulgate rules governing the independence and objec-
tivity of securities analysts and protecting analysts from retaliation by their firms because
of negative research or ratings. The SEC recently adopted such rules. See In re Regulation
Analyst Certification, SEC Rel. 33-8193, 2003 WL 397879, at *1 (Feb. 20, 2003).
110. See, e.g., In re Dealer Registration of J.P. Morgan Securities Inc., No. 03-019, 2003
WL 21024847, at *2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. April 24, 2003). See, e.g., In re Dealer Registration
of J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc., supra note 109, at *2.
111. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 02-41, 2002 WL
31685726, at *2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Nov. 26, 2002) (put legend on research might seek as
underwriting client), *3 (not to compensate research analysts on the basis of underwriting
revenues), *4 (have committee to monitor objectivity of analysts), *5 (in underwriting so-




investment advisor without being registered. 112 While the immediately
preceding legislative session required registration,' 13 this change makes
failure to register as an investment advisor comparable to failure to regis-
ter as a selling agent, subject to a prison term between two and ten years
or a fine up to $5,000, or both.114
The third change authorizes the Attorney General of Texas in an in-
junctive action to seek other equitable relief on behalf of the defrauded
investor, in particular, restitution and disgorgement.' 15
B. COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE TEXAS ACTS
The idea behind the basic anti-fraud provision of the Texas Securities
Act is to remove certain elements from a common law cause of action,
namely reliance and causation, making it easier for the investor to re-
cover.116 Nevertheless, some sellers attempt to reinsert the statutorily re-
moved elements. Since the legislature modeled this anti-fraud provision
after the federal law provision,'" 7 Texas courts use federal cases interpret-
ing the federal provision as a guide in interpreting the Texas provision.118
The 1995 amendment to the federal provision provided two litigants an
argument to attempt to reverse a century of securities law.
1. Texas Securities Act
In Murchison v. State,119 the trial court convicted the principals of a
broker-dealer holding firm of securities fraud under the Texas Securities
Act. These principals had sold holding firm debentures without disclos-
ing to the investors that (1) the principals had two years before sold de-
bentures of an affiliate to investors representing they were secured by
Treasuries, when actually only a fraction were so secured and subse-
quently became unsecured; (2) another affiliate responsible for producing
112. See Act of Sept. 1, 2003, 78th Leg. R.S., ch. 108, § 3, 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 147,
148 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581, § 281), see also
Comm. on Gov't Org., Bill Analysis, Texas S.B. 1060, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003).
113. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-13 (Vernon Supp. 2004); see also Flint,
supra note 4, at 2011.
114. Compare Act of Sept. 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 108, § 3, 2003 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 147, 148 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581, § 291),
with TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art 581-29(G) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
115. See Act of Sept. 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 108, 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 147, 149
(Vernon Supp. 2004) (amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581, § 32B and adding
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581, § 32C); see also Comm. on Gov't Org., Bill analysis,
Tex. S.B. 1060, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003).
116. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 581-33A(2) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
117. Compare TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33A(2) (Vernon Supp. 2003), with 15
U.S.C.A. § 771(a)(2) (West 1997); see Tex. Capital Sec., Inc. v. Sandefer, 58 S.W.3d 760, 775
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied); Anheuser-Busch Cos. v. Summit Cof-
fee Co., 858 S.W.2d 928, 939 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied), vacated on other
grounds, 514 U.S. 1001 (1995).
118. See Summers v. WellTech, Inc., 935 S.W.2d 228, 232-33 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1996, no writ).
119. Murchison v. State, 93 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet.
ref'd). This opinion dates from before the Survey period, but appeared much later in the
reporters with cases within the Survey period.
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revenue had net operating losses in each of the last six months; (3) an-
other affiliate had sold its inventory of securities, reducing its net capitali-
zation balances to below the limits allowed by the National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD); (4) the disclosed prior year's financials
were so outdated they showed a viable company when the company was
not; and (5) the holding firm needed the revenues from the debenture
sale to cover operating expenses. The principals challenged their convic-
tions on the grounds that the court wrongly excluded their expert witness
testimony. Other than the irrelevant testimony, the expert would testify
that the federal securities acts impose a due diligence requirement on
buyers of debentures. 120 The court recognized this argument for what it
was-an attempt to introduce a reliance requirement-which is not part
of the Texas Securities Act.1 21
The Murchison court easily disposed of the defendants' other alleged
errors. The defendants complained of the refusal for a jury instruction on
mistake of fact that would negate the intentional failure to disclose.122 In
a prosecution under the Texas Securities Act, the defendant must raise
mistaken belief for each of the material facts. 123 Just as the defendants'
attorney failed to provide expert testimony relevant to the five material
facts, he also failed to point to any evidence, however slight, to raise an
issue of mistaken belief with respect to those material facts. 124 The de-
fendants also failed to win on a sufficiency of the evidence challenge as
the court found more than ample evidence with respect to each of the five
material facts. 125
In Geodyne Energy Income Production Partnership I-E v. Newton
Corp. ,126 the seller of a ten percent working interest in an oil and gas
lease, well, and equipment did not disclose that the lease had expired. 127
The auction sale documents provided disclaimer of representations and
120. Id. at 250-51. The irrelevant testimony related to intent not to repay the deben-
tures, knowing the company could not repay, and failure to disclose some repurchase
agreements, none of which related to the five misstatements. For buyer's due diligence
requirement under federal law, see infra note 132 and accompanying text.
121. Murchison, 93 S.W. 3d at 250-51 (citing Birchfield v. State, 401 S.W. 2d 825, 828
(Tex. Crim. App. 1966)).
122. Id. at 251-52. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 8.02(a) (Vernon 2003).
123. Murchison, 93 S.W.3d at 252 (citing Gant v. State, 814 S.W.2d 444, 452-53 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1991, no writ)).
124, Id. at 252 (any evidence would have been sufficient to raise the mistake-of-fact
issue).
125. Id. at 254-56.
126. Geodyne Energy Income Prod. P'ship I-E v. Newton Corp., 97 S.W.3d 779 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2003, pet. filed).
127. Id. at 782, 787. An interest in or under an oil and gas lease is a security. See TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4A (Vernon Supp. 2004). The sale occurred by auction with
a price of $300. The suit involved liability for plugging the well in the amount of $742,409.
The interest's portion was $74,241. The successful investor also obtained a judgment for
$161,269 in legal fees, far in excess of the securities law damage remedy. However, the
appellate court remanded the attorney fee part to determine whether the fees for the se-




various warranties. 128 The purchaser also agreed to take the property "as
is". The trial court found for the investors. On appeal, the seller claimed
that the disclaimers and the "as is" language negated various elements of
the investors' cause of action under the Texas Securities Act, namely reli-
ance, causation, and misrepresentation or omission. They further argued
that the disclaimers constituted a waiver of the investors' rights under the
Texas Securities Act, and that the investors failed to conduct their own
due diligence as required by the auction sale. The seller's lawyer con-
cocted a reliance and causation element from the Texas Deceptive Trade
Act, which does have those two elements with the desired effect of an "as
is" disclaimer on the misrepresentation or omission.129 The rule for the
Texas Securities Act, however, is different. The court noted that an ac-
tion for fraud under the Texas Securities Act has no element of reli-
ance. 130 The court then split causation into two parts: causation for the
sale and causation for damages. The court concluded the Texas Securities
Act also has no element for causation for the sale. 31 With respect to
causation for damages, the Texas Securities Act follows the federal stat-
ute prior to its 1995 amendments to provide for reduced damages due to
market declines. 132 That law also provided that there was no element for
causation for damages.1 33 The assertion that the disclaimers negated any
misrepresentation or omission was an impermissible attempt to reintro-
duce reliance as an element of the cause of action."" The disclaimers
128. Id. at 782-83 (the purchaser agreed the seller had made no representations regard-
ing oil and gas production, marketable title, condition, quality, fitness for general or partic-
ular purposes, merchantability, accuracy of interest, or accuracy completeness of any data,
information, or material supplied to the purchaser).
129. Id. at 786 (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d
156, 161 (Tex. 1995)).
130. Id. at 783-84 (citing Hendricks v. Thornton, 973 S.W.2d 348, 360 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1998, pet. denied); Summers v. WellTech, Inc., 935 S.W.2d 228, 234 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ); Anheuser-Busch Cos. v. Summit Coffee Co., 858
S.W.2d 928, 936 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied)).
131. Id. at 784 (citing Weatherly v. Deloitte & Touche, 905 S.W.2d 642, 648-49 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Anheuser-Busch Cos., 858 S.W.2d at
936).
132. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33A(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004), with 15
U.S.C. § 771(b) (1997) (buyer's due diligence requirement). For pre-1995 federal law, see
Gasner v. Bd. of Supervisors, 103 F.3d 351, 360 n.10 (4th Cir. 1996). The Legislature spe-
cifically amended the Texas Securities Act in 1979 to make sure that there was no buyer's
due diligence requirement after a court had so determined. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 581-33 and cmt. to art. 581-33A(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (plaintiffs are relieved
from the difficult burden of proving that they could not have known of the untruth or
omission). Similarly, Congress specifically inserted such a requirement in the correspond-
ing federal provision in 1995. So federal and state law diverge on this point. The Fifth
Circuit requires an additional buyer's due diligence requirement as one of the elements of
the cause of action for a fraud action under federal Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2003). See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Herzog, 2 F.3d 135, 139 (5th Cir. 1993) (a buyer who has
exercised due diligence to pursue his own interest so that his reliance is justifiable).
133. Geodyne, 97 S.W.3d at 785 (citing Duperior v. Tex. State Bank, 28 S.W.3d 740, 753
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism'd); Casella v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir.
1989)).
134. Id. at 784 (citing Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir.
1970)). The only causal connection required is that a misrepresentation or omission is
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also do not constitute waivers since the Texas Securities Act voids such
waivers. 135 Moreover, under the Texas Securities Act, the investor has no
due diligence requirement.
13 6
Although the Geodyne trial court found liability properly, it erred with
respect to remedies. The trial court had awarded the purchase price as
damages, rather than rescission. Since the remedy is statutory, the court
merely reformed the judgment. The trial court also erred in failing to
separate attorney's fees granted under the Texas Securities Act 137 from
those connected to other claims and defenses. The court remanded for
this issue. 138
2. Texas Stock Fraud Act
Several cases appeared under the Texas Stock Fraud Act. 139 The Texas
Stock Fraud Act does not remove the traditional elements of reliance and
causation from a securities fraud action, 140 but it does allow punitive
damages.14 1 The cases under the Texas Stock Fraud Act involved an in-
vestor with no evidence of the various elements, the impact of a warranty
disclaimer on the action, and the application of the statute to corporate
misfeasance.
In Kapur v. Goldstein,142 a co-investor induced the investor to purchase
with him, by check and a promissory note, thirty units each of an oil and
gas production securities project that would yield a profit from the outset.
When the co-investor obtained a next-day refund, the promoter similarly
promised the investor a refund, but did not perform. The investor relied
on insufficient funds to thwart the check, however, a non-investor deposit
caused the check to clear. Four years later, after having a chance to de-
termine the investment's outcome, the investor sued the co-investor and
promoter for stock fraud under the Texas Stock Fraud Act. The trial
court granted a no evidence summary judgment for the defendants. The
appellate court affirmed. The investor provided no evidence of damages,
not the check, the cashing of the check, the promissory note, payments
made on the note. There was no evidence of the profit or loss on the
made in connection with the sale. Id. (citing Duperior, 28 S.W.3d at 753; Anheuser-Busch
Cos., 858 S.W.2d at 936). So state cases dealing with post sale misrepresentations and
federal cases dealing with secondary liability were irrelevant.
135. Id. at 786; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33L (Vernon Supp. 2004).
Waivers of past violations known to the waiving party are valid. Geodyne, 97 S.W.3d at
186 (citing Anheuser-Busch Cos., 858 S.W.2d at 936).
136. Geodyne, 97 S.W.3d at 783-86 (citing Duperior, 28 S.W.3d at 753; Summers, 935
S.W.2d at 234; In re Westcap Enters., 230 F.3d 717, 726 (5th Cir. 2000)).
137. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33D(7) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
138. Geodyne, 97 S.W.3d at 783-90.
139. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (2002). One case dealt with recovery of
attorney's fees under the Texas Stock Fraud Act. See Webb v. Abbruzzese, No. 4:03-CV-5,
2003 WL 21771017, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2003).
140. See, e.g., Burleson State Bank v. Plunkett, 27 S.W.3d 605, 611 (Tex. App.-Waco
2000, pet. denied) (scienter remains as amendment).
141. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(c) (Vernon 2002).
142. Kapur v. Goldstein, No. 01-02-0023-CV, 2003 WL 1848559 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] Apr. 10, 2003, no pet.) (memorandum opinion).
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project, causation, nor evidence that the transaction involved "stock."
The court could not determine what the transaction consisted of, much
less how it was to make a profit. 143
The Texas Stock Fraud Act issue in Benchmark Electronics, Inc. v. J.M.
Huber Corp.,144 dealt with the impact of a disclaimer and warranty provi-
sion in a written stock purchase agreement under which a Texas corpora-
tion purchased the stock of a subsidiary of a New Jersey corporation. The
trial court had determined that New York law, which allows no extra-
contractual fraud and misrepresentation claims, applied to both the con-
tract and tort claims and granted a summary judgment for the seller. 145
The Fifth Circuit, in reversing the summary judgment, however, deter-
mined that under the Texas choice of law rules, New York law governed
contract interpretation under a contractual choice of law clause contained
in the stock purchase agreement, but Texas law governed the tort claims.
Then as guidance to the trial court, the court of appeals divided the mis-
representations into those made during the negotiations and those sub-
jects of the warranty clause of the stock purchase agreement. Under New
York law, the disclaimer eliminates reliance on the pre-contractual repre-
sentations. Under Texas common law and the Texas Stock Fraud Act, the
warranty provision does not bar tort claims for fraudulent inducement or
fraud arising from false representations in the agreement.146
One litigant tried to use the Texas Stock Fraud Act, rather than federal
law, to remedy alleged accounting fraud in the secondary market, proba-
bly to obtain punitive damages.147 In Stephens v. Halliburton Com-
pany,148 two minor shareholders attempted to use the Texas Stock Fraud
Act and common law fraud to challenge the accounting method used by
the issuer for reports to the public. The shareholders alleged an omission
in not disclosing a change in accounting method and a resulting misrepre-
sentation in the financial reports that recognized revenue from the
change. The court dismissed the claim for a number of reasons, including
failure to state a claim under the Texas Stock Fraud Act and common law
fraud. The Texas Stock Fraud Act requires: (1) a false representation of
a material fact; (2) made with the intent to induce another person to
enter into a contract; and (3) was relied on by the person entering the
contract. The shareholders petition was devoid of any allegations con-
cerning entry into a contract or that the company induced them to
purchase the stock. For omission under the common law fraud action, the
shareholders needed to allege a duty to disclose. Texas law recognizes
143. Id. at *1-6.
144. Benchmark Elecs., Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 343 F.3d 719 (5th Cir. 2003).
145. Id. at 726. The trial court was the District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Id. at 719.
146. Id. at 726-30 (citing Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors,
Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1998) (common law); SMB Partners, Ltd. v. Osloub, 4 S.W.3d
368 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (Texas Stock Fraud Act)).
147. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(c) (2002).
148. Stephens v. Halliburton Co., No. CIV. A03:02-CV-1442-L, 2003 WL 22077752
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2003) (memorandum opinion).
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four such situations, none of which the shareholders alleged., 49 For the
misrepresentation peculiarly within the perpetrator's knowledge, the in-
vestors may base their allegations on information and belief, but under
the federal pleading rules interpreted in the Fifth Circuit, they must al-
lege a factual basis for the belief.150 The investors' pleadings lacked any
factual basis for believing that the issuer's treatment of unresolved claims
and change orders were based on speculation rather than reasonable ex-
pectations, or that revenues reported from the unresolved claims and
change orders were not probable and could not be reliably estimated.
The investors also failed to explain why the SEC filings were false or
misleading.151
C. ARBITRATIONS UNDER THE TEXAS ACTS
Securities fraud is also a method for investors to reach their own bro-
kers; however, these actions are usually subject to arbitration as provided
in their broker contracts. 152 There were several arbitrations against bro-
kers conducted by the NASD involving the Texas Securities Acts. Arbi-
ters seldom explain their' decisions as appellate courts153 do and need not
follow the rules of law. 154 Yet, some trends are ascertainable.
Arbitrations almost invariably deal with investments that declined in
value-typically more than $100,000-although recently most claims in-
volved far more.155 One reason for the high threshold may be attorney's
fees, for which the Texas Securities Act allows recovery.1 56 Most com-
149. Id. at *7-10. The four are (1) a special or fiduciary relationship; (2) partial disclo-
sure failing to disclose the whole truth; (3) failure to disclose new information that would
make prior information not misleading; and (4) partial disclosure conveying a false impres-
sion. Id. (citing Lesikar v. Rappeport, 33 S.W.3d 282, 299 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000,
pet. denied)).
150. Id. at *8 (citing United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia HCA/Healthcare
Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 1997)). The rule is FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
151. Stephens, 2003 WL 22077752 at *1-9.
152. Brokerage agreements commonly provide for arbitration of all disputes between
broker and customer. Since securities transactions are "transactions involving commerce,"
the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1999), governs, not the Texas Arbitration Act,
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon Supp. 2003). See, e.g., In re Mony
Sec. Corp., 83 S.W.3d 279, 282 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). Since 1989, the
Supreme Court has permitted arbitration of securities fraud actions under the federal act.
See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (revers-
ing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (for claims under the Securities Act of 1933));
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (reversing Wilko, 346 U.S. at
438 (banning securities arbitration for claims under the Exchange Act of 1934)).
153. See, e.g., Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-37 (arbiters are not required to explain their rea-
sons); O.R. Sec. v. Prof'l Planning Assocs., Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 747 (11th Cir. 1988) (simi-
larly for securities arbitration).
154. See, e.g., Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-37 (arbiters are reversed only for manifest disre-
gard of the law); Miller v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 884 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1004 (1990) (for securities arbitration to reverse the arbiters it is not
enough to show they misinterpreted the law or misapplied the law).
155. See infra notes 157-166.
156. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581, § 33(D)(7) (Vernon Supp. 2003). Not
every arbitrator is allowed attorney's fees, but those allowed amounted to approximately
$50,000. See Ferguson v. Prospera Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 02-01254, 2003 WL 21441817, at *3
(June 6, 2003) (N.A.S.D., Arb.) ($60,000 attorney fees and $8,000 costs); Coselli v. Primex
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plaints concerned volatile recommendations 157 or unauthorized trades. 158
Other complaints involved losses in a declining market, 159 unsuitabil-
Prime Elect. Execution, Inc., No. 01-06623, 2003 WL 450645, at *3 (Jan. 29, 2003) (NASD
Arb.) (attorney's fees of $56,000); Bloomer v. Josephthal & Co., Inc., No. 01-06025, 2002
WL 31971782, at *2 (Dec. 24, 2002) (NASD Arb.) ($20,000 attorney's fees); Rottler v.
Sands Bros. & Co., No. 01-04036, 2002 WL 31987266, at *2 (Dec. 13, 2002) (N.A.S.D. Arb.)
($31,080 attorney's fees); de Luna Valenzuela v. WM Fin. Sers., No. 01-05914, 2002 WL
31656721, at *2 (Nov. 7, 2002) (N.A.S.D. Arb.) ($126,400 attorney's fees). There is also the
claimant's risk of paying the other party's legal fees. See Howe v. Carty & Co., No. 01-
06490, 2003 WL 271329, at *3 (Jan. 23, 2003) (N.A.S.D. Arb.) (claimant pay to brokerage
$2774 attorney's fees). Expert witness fees are also not small. See Thurston v. S.W. Sec.,
Inc., No. 01-06902, 2003 WL 1192951, at *2 (Feb. 27, 2003) (N.A.S.D. Arb.) ($13,500 expert
witness fee); Bloomer, 2002 WL 31971782, at *3 ($6,000 expert witness fee).
157. For claimant recoveries, see Thurston, 2003 WL 1192951, at *1-2 ($1,000,000 claim
for selling conservative investments for investment trusts composed of technology and tele-
communication stocks under the TSA; recovered $66,500 and $13,500 expert witness fee);
Vaughan v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., No. 01-01931, 2002 WL 31656639, at *4-5 (Nov. 5,
2002) (N.A.S.D. Arb.) ($2,600,000 claim for transactions in high risk stocks and mutual
funds under TSA; recovered about $145,000 plus $60,000 costs); Pryor v. CIBC World
Mkts. Corp, No. 02-02367, 2003 WL 21262116, at *1-2 (May 22, 2003) (N.A.S.D. Arb.)
($500,000 claim for risky and unsuitable mutual fund investments under the Texas Securi-
ties Act (TSA), the Texas Stock Fraud Act (TSFA), and the Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
tice Act (DTPA); recovered $25,840); Levitt v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., No.01-04609,
2002 WL 31957693, at *2-3 (Dec. 31, 2002) (N.A.S.D. Arb.) ($699,897 claim for trading in
unmanaged mutual fund shares (unitrusts) and day trading under TSA, TSFA, and DTPA;
recovered approximately $65,000). For respondent dismissals, see Stein v. UBS Fin. Servs.,
Inc., No. 02-02931, 2003 WL 22096987, at *2 (Aug. 25, 2003) (N.A.S.D. Arb.) ($96,000
claim for recommendation of a volatile, high risk mutual fund for four conservative risk
accounts, under TSA; dismissed and expunged); Stanmyre v. Radzikowski, No. 01-04778,
2003 WL 271331, at *2 (Jan. 21, 2003) (N.A.S.D. Arb.) ($2,300,000 claim for selling to
claimants lesser known and extremely volatile risky high tech stocks under TSA, TSFA,
and DTPA; dismissed); Vitale v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 01-05618,
2003 WL 223360 (Jan. 14, 2003) (N.A.S.D., Arb.) ($1,000,000 claim for recommending in-
vestment in high risk high tech companies under TSA, TSFA, and DTPA; dismissed);
Cutbirth v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 01-04013, 2003 WL 21183554,
at *2 (May 6, 2003) (N.A.S.D., Arb.) ($500,000 claim for purchase of aggressive growth
stocks, aggressive growth mutual funds and options under TSFA and DTPA; dismissed).
158. For claimant recoveries, see Crusius v. Sunamerica Sec., Inc., No. 01-05590, 2003
WL 21221837, at *2-3 (April 28, 2003) (N.A.S.D., Arb.) ($2,500,000 claim for unauthorized
investment in mutual funds; recovered $2,500,000; ordered surrender of mutual funds by
claimant; Karosa to reimburse brokerage for $61,000 in commissions and pay exemplary
damages of $100,000); Hersh v. Kaufman, No. 02-01563, 2003 WL 1193047, at *2-3 (Feb.
27, 2003) (N.A.S.D., Arb.) ($67,000 and $201,000 punitives under Florida law, but agree-
ment is governed by Texas law, for failure to supervise, churning, and unauthorized trad-
ing; recovered $67,000 and attorney's fees); Coselli, 2003 WL 450645, at *2-3 ($509,887 for
losses on unsuitable penny stocks including mental anguish under DTPA, TSA, and TSFA;
recovered $436,398, plus attorney's fees of $56,000 and costs of $1,500). For respondent
dismissals, see Khavanin v. Fins. & Sec., Inc., No. 01-06669, 2003 WL 1986974, at *2-3
(April 17, 2003) (N.A.S.D. Arb.) ($227,583 claim for unauthorized trading of stock and
failure to follow instructions under TSA, dismissed); Rosemaladi v. First Union Sec., Inc.,
No. 01-07115, 2003 WL 21518515, at *2 (June 18, 2003) (N.A.S.D., Arb.) ($250,000 claim
for unauthorized trades, churning, and unsuitable investments from 1994 to 1996 under
TSA, TSFA, and DTPA; dismissed due to statute of limitation).
159. For claimant recoveries, see Ikbal v. Cantella & Co., Inc., No.02-01695, 2003 WL
22096732, at *1.4 (Aug. 25, 2003) (N.A.S.D., Arb.) ($500,000 claim for investments de-
clined, under TSA and TSFA; dismissed and expunged as settled for $169,500); Adin v.
Henry, No. 00-02683, 2003 WL 1210899, at *2-5 (Mar. 3, 2003) (N.A.S.D., Arb.) (about
$260,000 claim for purchase of debentures and common stock now worthless under TSA;
recovered about $50,000 against Stoeger who did not appear or answer; against remaining
parties dismissed). For respondent dismissals, see Howe, 2003 WL 271329, at *2-3
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ity,160 mismanagement of investments, 161 unregistered securities, 162 in-
vestments in Enron Corporation, 163 lack of broker supervision, 164 and
execution errors. 165 Other reported actions did not specify the offense. 166
D. COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACTS
The Fifth Circuit delivered four opinions involving the federal securi-
ties laws-one criminal action and three class actions under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). 167 The criminal pros-
ecution for fraud in a private placement offering under Section 17 of the
Securities Act of 1933168 involved various securities law challenges to the
exclusion of expert witness testimony and to the jury charge. The three
class actions, each dealing with the private cause of action under Rule
lOb-51 69 under the Exchange Act of 1934, floundered on the failure to
sufficiently plead a strong inference of scienter under the PSLRA.170 The
($1,000,000 claim for bond transactions under TSA, TSFA, and DTPA; dismissed and
claimant ordered to -pay brokerage $2774 in attorney's fees).
160. For complainant recoveries, see Ferguson, 2003 WL 21441817, at *2-3 ($500,000
claim and $5 million punitives for unsuitable trading, churning, and failure to supervise
under TSA, TSFA, and DTPA; recovered from agent about $425,000 with $25,000 puni-
tives, $60,000 attorney fees, and $8,000 costs when agent did not appear or answer);
Bloomer, 2002 WL 31971782, at *2-3 ($63,000 claim for unsuitability of risky small-cap,
high beta stocks purchased on margin under TSA; recovered $78,000, $20,000 attorney's
fees under TSA, and $6,000 expert witness fee).
161. For complainant recoveries, see Robin Allen Revocable Trust v. Morgan Stanley
Dean Witter, No. 02-00400, 2003 WL 1860712, at *2 (Mar. 24, 2003) (N.A.S.D., Arb.)
($2,659,155 claim for gross mismanagement of a mutual fund under TSA, TSFA, and
DTPA; dismissed and expunged as settled (amount unspecified)); Freeman v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 02-00117, 2003 WL 431608, at *2 (Feb. 5, 2003)
(N.A.S.D., Arb.) ($360,535 claim for failure to supervise through mishandling of assets by
various investment advisors selected by defendants under DTPA; recovered $90,360).
162. For complainant recovery, see de Luna Valenzuela, 2002 WL 31656721, at *1-2
($100,000 claim for purchase of unregistered security under the TSA, TSFA, and DTPA;
recovered $91,500 plus $126,400 attorney's fees).
163. For respondent dismissals, see McCandlish v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., No. 02-
00995, 2003 WL 21554344, at *1 (June 20, 2003) (N.A.S.D., Arb.) ($5,109 claim for recom-
mendation of Enron bonds under DTPA; dismissed)
164. For complainant recovery, see Waldrop v. UBS Painewebber, Inc., No. 02-01397,
2002 WL 21378124 (May 27, 2003) (N.A.S.D., Arb.) ($2,800,000 claim for failure to super-
vise with respect to technology stocks under TSA, TSFA, and DTPA; recovered $595,000).
165. For respondent dismissal, see Roal Global Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., No. 00-04163, 2003 WL 21439839, at *1-2 (May 27, 2003) (N.A.S.D., Arb.)
($9,000,000 claim for failing to execute limit orders and errors with respect to executions in
trading of common stock and treasury securities under DTPA; dismissed).
166. For complainant recoveries, see Prappas v. TD Waterhouse Investor Servs., Inc.,
No. 01-05299, 2003 WL 21262044, at *1 (May 22, 2003) (N.A.S.D., Arb.) ($500,000 unspeci-
fied under TSA and DTPA; dismissed and expunged as settled (amount unspecified)); Rot-
ter, 2002 WL 31987266, at *102 (100,000 claim for OTC trades and IPOs under TSA and
DTPA; recovered $62,000 and $31,080 in attorney's fees).
For respondent dismissal, see Givens v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., No. 01-06566, 2002
WL 331783079 (Nov. 25, 2002) (N.A.S.D., Arb.) ($250,000 claim with respect to investment
account under TSA, TSFA, and DTPA; recovered $43,000).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1997).
168. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1997).
169. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
170. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1997).
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Fifth Circuit used these three opinions to expand its protection of issuers
from harassing lawsuits beyond the insufficiency of pleading scienter by
motive and opportunity, as provided in Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc.,171 to
include insufficiency of only additional hindsight for forward-looking
statements and to also include insufficiency of only additional decision-
making roles. One of the three also involved sections 11 and 12 of the
Securities Act of 1933,172 providing the Fifth Circuit an opportunity to
join the Third Circuit in determining that general statements of future
prospects are not material. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit joined other cir-
cuits in permitting aftermarket purchasers standing to sue under Section
11 for misstatements in registration statements.
In the criminal case of United States v. Tucker,173 the chief executive
officer of a company engaged in acquiring automobile loans and packag-
ing them for sale to financial institutions and large investors, and also
organized trusts with the goal of raising money for the company to bor-
row. The officer drafted a private placement memorandum for the sale of
the trust certificates, representing that the trusts would only use the funds
raised to invest in automobile loans, insurance reserves, or cash reserves.
In Regulation D filings, the officer represented that the money would not
be used for salaries, fees, or repayment of debt. The officer later pre-
pared financial records demonstrating use of the offered proceeds as
called for in the private placement memoranda, while actually the officer
had used substantial amounts for company salaries, rent, legal fees, reim-
bursement payments to investors of earlier trusts, and other operating
expenses, such as travel and entertainment. The officer also concealed
information from the selling brokers concerning non-accredited investors
investing in the trusts. To overturn his conviction for securities fraud, the
officer devised a number of securities arguments with respect to the ex-
clusion of his expert witness' testimony and the trial court's jury charge.
The expert witness was to testify that (1) the securities industry use of the
term "invest" included payment for certain operating expenses; (2) the
certificates redeemable on demand were not "securities;" (3) the officer
relied on advice of counsel that the certificates were not securities; and
(4) the selling brokers, not the officer, were responsible for the Regula-
tion D filings reporting an incorrect number of non-accredited investors.
The court determined that excluding the testimony on the term "invest"
was not manifestly erroneous, since the proceeds were used for other
items, such as the Ponzi scheme of repayments to earlier investors. Ex-
171. Nathenson v. Zonagen, 267 F.3d 400, 412 (5th Cir. 2001); see Rosenzweig v. Azurix
Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 867 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Abrams v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 292 F.3d
424, 430 (5th Cir. 2002), for the proposition); Goldstein v. MCI WorldCom, 340 F.3d 238,
246 (5th Cir. 2003). Some other circuits claim that motive and opportunity are sufficient.
See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 (2000);
In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999). The Fifth Circuit differs from
these other circuits on this point.
172. 15 U.S.C. § 77k-I (1997)
173. Unites States v. Tucker, 345 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2003). The trial court was the East-
ern District of Texas. Id. at 320.
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clusion of the securities definition was proper since the officer only of-
fered it for a legal determination, and the court believed under the
Supreme Court's "family resemblance" approach that the certificates
were securities. 174 To determine that exclusion of the officer's reliance
testimony was proper, the Fifth Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's posi-
tion that the focus is on the seller's intent to defraud investors, rather
than the seller's belief concerning the nature of the securities. 75 Exclu-
sion of the Regulation D testimony was proper since it would not be help-
ful to a trier of fact because the officer had sabotaged the broker's
obligation. The officer presented two securities law challenges to the jury
charge-that it failed to submit the "security" element to the jury and
that it incorrectly stated the intent as "knowingly or willfully." The court
found no error on the security element, since the officer had admitted this
was a legal question and the judge found the certificates to be securities.
Although the intent charge was incorrect, other parts of the jury charge
made it quite clear that requisite mens rea included "willfully."'1 76
In the class action dealing with forward-looking statements concerning
purchases in the aftermarket for an initial public offering, Rosenzweig v.
Azurix Corp.,177 aftermarket investors in a global water and wastewater
company filed a class action lawsuit complaining of optimistic, forward-
looking statements. Such statements were made in the prospectus and
registration statement, in post-IPO Securities and Exchange Commission
filings, press releases, and in a news article. The class brought the action
under both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934.178
The district court dismissed the action. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. In
dismissing the fraud in connection with a sale action, the Fifth Circuit
received another opportunity to deal with the sufficiency of scienter
pleadings under the Exchange Act.1 79 The PSLRA requires particularity
of facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter.180 The class pled little
more than insufficient motive and opportunity. The additional allega-
tions related to statements in a subsequent report, subsequent failures of
the company's core businesses, and subsequent resignation of officers.
These allegations failed to provide a strong inference of scienter since
they dealt only with a hindsight assessment of the company's forward
looking statements-the alleged misrepresentations. The Fifth* Circuit
also grabbed the opportunity to partially insulate forward-looking state-
ments as immaterial. The PSLRA provides a safe harbor provision for
174. Id. at 329 (citing Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66-77 (1990)).
175. Id. at 331 (citing United States v. Brown, 578 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1978); Buffo
v. Graddick, 742 F.2d 592, 597 (11th Cir. 1984)).
176. Id. at 334-35.
177. Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854 (5th Cir. 2003). The trial court was the
District Court of the Southern District of Texas. Id. at 854.
178. Id. at 861-62 (bringing the action under Sections 11, 12, and 15 of the 1933 Act and
Rule lOb-5 under the 1934 Act).
179. Id. at 867-68; see Flint, supra note 4, at 2021-22 (discussing Abrams v. Baker
Hughes, Inc., 292 F.3d 424, 430 (5th Cir. 2002)).
180. Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 866; see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1997).
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forward-looking statements if the speaker identifies the statement as a
forward-looking statement and accompanies it with a meaningful caution-
ary statement. 181 All of the challenged documents satisfied this safe har-
bor provision. The Fifth Circuit, nevertheless, went on to join the Fourth
Circuit by noting that generalized, positive statements about the com-
pany's strengths, management, and prospects are immaterial since ana-
lysts rely on facts, not company expressions of optimism in determining
security prices.' 82 Consequently, actionable predictive statements typi-
cally cause a price reaction, coupled with insider trading in suspicious
amounts and at suspicious times, none of which did the class plead.1 83
The Fifth Circuit disposed of the Securities Act action under standing and
materiality. For the misrepresentation in a sale action, 184 the Fifth Circuit
noted that liability falls only on the direct seller, his agent, or a financially
interested party who solicits the sale. 185 The Fifth Circuit joined the
Third Circuit by rejecting the class' contention that signing the registra-
tion statement constituted solicitation and requiring the solicitor to have
a direct communication with the buyer.1 86 For the misrepresentation in a
registration statement action, 18 7 the Fifth Circuit joined several other cir-
cuits in finding that aftermarket purchasers have standing to sue.' 8 8 Nev-
ertheless, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the action, along with the control
person action,' 89 on the basis of its materiality rationale for the Exchange
Act action. 190
In the class action of Goldstein v. MCI WorldCom,'9 1 dealing with the
decision-making role of the perpetrators, the class complained in a Rule
10b-5 action under the Exchange Act. The class asserted that the chief
executive officer and chief financial officer delayed writing off $685 mil-
lion in uncollectible receivables to artificially inflate the stock price dur-
ing a pending merger, which, when revealed, caused a twenty percent
drop in the stock price. The district court dismissed the actions against
the officers and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The alleged misstatements ap-
181. Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 866; see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(a)(ii) (1997).
182. Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 869 (citing Raab v. Gen. Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290
(4th Cir. 1993)).
183. Id. at 870 (citing Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 169 (5th Cir. 1994)).
184. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(a) (1997).
185. Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 871 (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 647 (1988)).
186. Id. at 871 (citing Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir.
1989)).
187. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1997).
188. Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 872-73 (citing Demaria v. Andersen, 318 F.3d 170,175-78
(2d Cir. 2003); Lee v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 294 F.3d 969, 974-78 (8th Cir. 2002); Joseph v.
Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1158-61 (10th Cir. 2000); Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners, Inc., 191 F.3d
1076, 1079-82 (9th Cir. 1999)). Supreme Court dicta in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513
U.S. 561, 572 (1995), created the possibility that aftermarket purchasers lacked standing
under Section 11. See Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 872.
189. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1997).
190. Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 858-74.
191. Goldstein v. MCI WorldCom, 340 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 2003). The district court was
the Southern District of Mississippi. Id. at 238. Although this is not in Texas, the Fifth
Circuit's opinion applies in Texas.
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peared in press releases, telephone conferences with the investing com-
munity, Forms 10-K, and 10-Q, and a prospectus. The Fifth Circuit
accepted the falsity of the statements for purposes of the dismissal on the
basis of an SEC rule, deeming the financial statements not to have been
prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Prac-
tices.1 92 The main issue for the Fifth Circuit dealt with what additional
circumstantial evidence would satisfy the PSLRA's requirement for a
strong inference of scienter when only motive and opportunity are insuf-
ficient. The class listed four additional items, besides the motive of per-
formance-based compensation, as evidence of scienter: (1) the timing of
the write-offs; (2) the size of the write-offs; (3) involvement in the day-to-
day operations; and (4) decision-making roles. With respect to these
items, the Fifth Circuit hunted for allegations that tied these events to the
misstatements. The class provided no allegations tying the officers to the
instruction of a lower officer to perform the write-off and so did not indi-
cate knowledge of the instruction. The size of the write-offs were no
greater than earlier write-offs of the company and did not indicate knowl-
edge of the problem. Similarly, close involvement in management does
not imply knowledge of the problem. As to the decision-making process,
the class' pleadings indicated that the legal department, not the officers,
initiated write-offs and this also did not indicate a knowledge of the prob-
lem. A second issue dealt with relief from the judgment due to new evi-
dence, namely SEC filings, guilty pleas in criminal proceedings, numerous
internal memoranda, various court pleadings, congressional documents,
and press releases, to supply the missing strong inference of scienter. 193
Determining that the PSLRA does not bar such evidence, nevertheless,
the class failed since they did not provide any explanation as to how the
new evidence was material and controlling and would have produced a
different result.1 94
In the third class action of Zishka v. American Pad & Paper Co., 195 the
class alleged misrepresentations with respect to an acquisition strategy, a
pricing strategy, and in manipulating the last-in first-out accounting
method to maintain false earnings. The district court dismissed the action
and the Fifth Circuit affirmed since the class failed to adequately plead
scienter. The only allegations to infer scienter involved insider trading
and the officers' positions, which the Fifth Circuit found regular and in-
sufficient to infer scienter.196
192. Id. at 249 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-10(a)(1)).
193. Id. at 255-56 (under a FED. R. Civ. P. 60 motion for relief from the judgment).
194. Id. at 241-59.
195. Zishka v. Am. Pad & Paper Co., 72 Fed. Appx. 130 (5th Cir. 2003). The district
court was the Northern District of Texas. The opinion has little precedential value.
196. Id. at 131-32.
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